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As social beings, people need to be able to interact intelligently with others in their
social environment. Accordingly, people spend much time conversing with one another
in order to understand the broad and fine aspects of the relations that link them. They
are especially interested in the interactive behaviors that constitute social relations, such
as mutual aid, gift giving and exchange, sharing, informal socializing, or deception. The
evaluations of these behaviors are embedded in social relationships and charged with
values and emotions. We developed tasks to probe how people in an unfamiliar socio-
cultural setting understand and account for the behavior of others conditional upon their
category membership – by trying to elicit the basic categories, stereotypes, and models
that inform the causal perceptions, inferences and reasoning people use in understanding
others’ interactive behaviors – and we tested these tasks among the Wampar in Papua
New Guinea. The results show changes in the relevance of social categories among the
ampar but also, and perhaps more important, limitations in the translation and applicability
of cognitive tasks.
W
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INTRODUCTION
As social beings, people need to be able to interact intelligently
with those others who constitute their interactive environment
(Sperber and Hirschfeld, 2004). Accordingly, people spend much
time conversing with one another in order to understand the broad
and fine aspects of the relations in which they and others engage.
To understand others and to have better control about their own
relations, they need enough information on the history and con-
text of behaviors. Social interaction therefore depends on – and
produces – a range of activities related to causal cognition: asking
for explanations of behavior of other animate beings, construing
possible causes and reasons, and/or ascribing responsibility for
what emerges from this behavior.
Most people are especially interested in the interactive behav-
iors that constitute social relations: mutual aid, gift giving and
exchange, sharing, informal socializing, deception, free-riding and
so on. Social behaviors have moral characteristics that index and
have consequences for particular relationships; people have defi-
nite expectations about who will or should behave in which way
and these are often based on essentialist assumptions (Gelman
and Hirschfeld, 1999; Gil-White, 2001; Sousa et al., 2002; Gelman,
2003; Waxman et al., 2007). Wampar, like others described in the
ethnographic literature [see the special issue edited by Danziger
and Rumsey (2013)], are sometimes circumspect about reading
other people’s minds, but in many settings they are only too eager
to discuss and evaluate the behavior, motivations and reasoning
of others.
Our aim was to make explicit the information-searches and
presumed causes concerning social behaviors by stimulating
discussions with subjects using short scenarios intended to moti-
vate people to reason about relations and motivations involved
in the scenarios. We developed tasks to probe how people under-
stand and account for the behavior of others conditional upon
their social relations – by targeting basic categories and stereo-
types (Hirschfeld, 1996), as well as the models and biases in
causal attribution (Morris and Peng, 1994; Morris et al., 1995;
Choi et al., 1999; Bender and Beller, 2011) and ascription of
responsibility (Bender et al., 2007, 2012; Beller et al., 2009) that
inform the causal perceptions, inferences and reasoning people
use in understanding others’ interactive behaviors (Schlottmann
et al., 2006). The tasks and results reported here were part of
a pilot-study by the first author during her fieldwork among
the Wampar in Morobe Province in Papua New Guinea (PNG)
from March to May 20131. The main goal of the study was to
test if these tasks could be made relevant to local participants
and hence could be used in a large-scale comparative study on
causality and sociality. Our aim in this paper is to share the
insights emerging from this process with regard to the difficul-
ties encountered that may, but need not be specific to this field
site.
1This fieldwork tied in with previous fieldwork among Wampar in Gabsongkeg
by the first author (1997, 1999/2000, 2002, 2003/04, and 2009), and continued
a research agenda inspired by the ethnographic work of Hans Fischer, begun in
the 1950s. Fischer had conducted fieldwork in Gabmadzung in 1965, and then in
Gabsongkeg in 1971/72, 1976, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999/2000, 2003/04, and
2009. In 2009/2010, Doris Bacalzo and Tobias Schwörer did research in Dzifasing,
and Heide Lienert, Christiana Lütkes, Rita Kramp, and Juliane Neuhaus worked in
different Wampar villages (Fischer, 1975, 1996; Beer, 2006).
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In the following, we first provide some background information
on the socio-cultural context of the Wampar, before describing the
two studies that were conducted there, one employing an active
information search with fictive scenarios on social behavior, the
other using such scenarios to evoke evaluative responses. As it
turned out that the main insight to be gleaned from these studies is
not so much their empirical results, but rather the methodological
problems they pose, the discussion focuses on those challenges
that arise from this kind of cross-cultural research (cf. Baumard
and Sperber, 2010).
SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT
The Wampar2 are a language group of about 12–15000 persons,
occupying the area of the middle Markham River in Morobe
2When we write about“the Wampar,” the reader should keep in mind that“Wampar”
have not always been a bounded social unit with its own territory. There have been
kin groups fighting against each other and moving through the mountains and
the Markham Valley. As in other parts of Papua New Guinea “ethnicity is based
on continua of cultural difference in a population crisscrossed by flows of people”
(Golub, 2014, p. 118).
Province of PNG (see Figure 1). They live in eight villages, five
of them close to the Highlands Highway. The concentration of the
population in villages is a post-contact phenomenon, developed
under the influence of colonialism and Christianization after 1911.
The Wampar practice of building houses in gardens away from the
villages offsets this centralization in some areas, and in the last
few decades many of these garden houses have developed into new
hamlets away from the main village. With new economic opportu-
nities through cash crops, cattle and chicken farms, and marketing
along the main Highway, additional settlements have proliferated
(Fischer, 1996, pp. 124–128). Today Wampar occupy an almost
“suburbanized” area, with much of the population accustomed to
engagement with the market economy.
Aside from the growth in number of hamlets and orien-
tation toward the Highlands Highway (and market economy),
there has also been an increasing factionalism in the dominant
Evangelical Lutheran Church and the growth of new religious
denominations and churches. Thus, the once centralizing force
of a single institutional church as the center of village life from
the early colonial period has been dissolved as well. Fischer
FIGURE 1 | Map of PNG and Wampar villages (map H. Schnoor).
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 128 | 2
Beer and Bender Causal reasoning about others’ behavior
(1975, 1996), who has studied the Wampar since the late 1950s,
observed that until the 1970s, all Wampar conceptualized them-
selves as members of one of the about 30 named social groups
called sagaseg. Wampar speak of sagaseg as patrilineal groups,
but – as often happens in PNG – the incorporation of non-
patrilineal kin is common. Also, the fusion of non-related sagaseg
is historically verifiable. Furthermore, marriage patterns and prac-
tices have been diverse and are changing, with, for example,
increases in interethnic marriages, children born out of wed-
lock and adoptions. Marriages within the same sagaseg were
formerly subject to sanctions, but this is no longer the case,
and some young people have even become unclear about their
membership of a sagaseg (Fischer, 1996, pp. 129–144; Beer,
2006).
These changes (Beer, 2006; Beer and Schroedter, 2015)
and others (including the very real possibility that a large
gold/copper mine will be opened) have tended to challenge
the hegemony of descent identities; what defines a Wampar,
who counts as a member of the sagaseg, and how inter-sagaseg
relations are configured are less clear than they once were.
Fieldwork between 2009 and 2013 made it clear that kin net-
works, which now often join ethnically different groups, have
complexified Wampar ideas concerning boundaries and signif-
icant social identities. In practice, the specific circumstances
of particular social actors and the kind of relationships that
they have among themselves and with their extended families,
including those of interethnic marriages, have become deci-
sive in accounting for commitments between individuals and
groups.
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
The study consisted of two parts: the first adopted the“active infor-
mation search” paradigm (Frey et al., 1996; Huber et al., 2011) and
comprised two short scenarios developed to probe naïve incli-
nations in the reading of intentions and behaviors of others, in
contrasting types of behavior (helping and deception); the second
part consisted of a narrated (fictive) scenario to evoke evalua-
tive responses to behaviors of others and assumptions about the
nature of categories and relations of the people involved. The order
of tasks was the same for all participants, with Part 2 following
Part 1.
In contrast to the majority of cross-cultural studies, we did
not take a task that had been refined for usage with “WEIRD”
(Henrich et al., 2010) samples, but aimed at formulating sce-
narios and questions relevant to the lived experience of social
interaction in the local population under study to avoid what
Medin et al. (2010) call the “home-field disadvantage.” We con-
structed stories of the sort, familiar to any social group, and
especially also of non-WEIRD societies. As examples we chose
behaviors which form the basis for inter-subjectivity and sociality,
such as cooperation, commensality, and the morality3 of rela-
tionships, which are grounded in structured forms of interactions
3We understand by ‘morality’ collectively sanctioned rules, beliefs and central values
that inform the everyday considerations of actors encountering choices and ambiva-
lence in social interactions. These considerations are contextual and relational.
Accordingly, we use morality here interchangeably with ethics.
and on capacities as intention attribution, strategizing, or planned
deception.
All tasks were written in English and translated into PNG’s
lingua franca Tok Pisin (which is more and more frequently used
among Wampar, especially between Wampar parents and their
children, and most of the time in interactions with non-Wampar),
but were presented verbally.
PART 1: ACTIVE INFORMATION SEARCH FOR SCENARIOS ON
SOCIAL BEHAVIORS
The main goal of Part 1 was to investigate which type of infor-
mation Wampar consider to be essential for venturing causal
explanations of the course of social interactions. It therefore
amounted to an active information search task, in which the pre-
sentation of a target question (on distinct social behaviors) was
aimed at generating further questions (e.g., about the persons
involved, their relations, or the situation) relevant to the evalua-
tion of the behavior described in the scenarios. We also wanted to
know what initial reason/causes people imputed to the characters
described in the scenarios.
METHODS
Participants
Twelve Wampar from the village of Gabsongkeg participated in
this part of the study (five women, six men, and one schoolboy),
but its analysis is confined to the adults. The trial interview with the
7-years old schoolboy generated only one answer, which was not to
the point: he commented on his own past behavior4. The results
are therefore reported for 11 participants (age M = 40.0 years,
range: 18–73). All of them went at least to elementary school and
were involved in farming and some small business. More infor-
mation about biography, education, and family background of
all participants is available because the ethnographer has known
them since 1997. The interviews were relaxed and all participants
were free to discuss personal and/or problematic topics.
Material
The task revolved around two target scenarios, each followed
by a set of three questions. The scenarios focused on the social
interaction of “helping” and “deceiving,” respectively:
(A) “X helps Y to finish some hard and boring work:”
(A1) “Why do you think X helped Y?”
(A2) “Ask me questions: what do you need to know to answer
the question why he/she helps?”
(A3) “How would you say other people (living in your
neighborhood/village) would explain why X helps Y?”
(B) “X deceives Y by not giving him his share of the proceeds of a
joint business/work”
(B1) “Why do you think X deceived Y?”
(B2) “Ask me questions: what do you need to know to explain
why X does that?”
(B3) “How would you say other people (living in your
neighborhood/village) would explain why X does this?”
4That he refused to answer more questions was astonishing, as the boy is otherwise
not shy, but very talkative and shares his opinions even on matters which are usually
topics for adults. It is, however, in line with some of our other findings and will be
discussed below.
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X and Y were replaced either by local male and female names or by
“a man” or “a woman.” When necessary the interviewer gave for
“hard and boring work” local examples like carrying something
heavy, or cleaning a big garden.
The first questions (A1, B1) aimed at finding out how people
reason about the described behaviors. The second questions (A2,
B2) were connected to the first and are very open; they tried to
identify what information people ask for if they feel uncertain
about the reasons for the behavior. The third questions (A3, B3)
aimed at getting access to participants’ ideas about shared (and
non-shared) desires, beliefs, and reasons for behavior.
Questions 1 and 3 thus directly targeted causal explanations,
the latter with a focus on sharedness. We expected that mutual aid
was explained more often in terms of balanced and generalized
reciprocity, specificities of the situation, and less often by individ-
ual characteristics of personality or in terms of market exchange.
Question 2 was intended to produce data on the information peo-
ple considered most relevant to establishing causal explanations.
Here, we expected people to ask either for attributes of the category
of people involved (such as sex, age, or ethnicity), their personal
attributes, and information about the relation they have, or for
more details about the situation.
Procedure and design
All participants were given both scenarios with three questions
each in the above order; scenarios were read identical or very
similar to the original text; eight of the 12 interviews were
fully recorded. Furthermore, the ethnographer made detailed
notes on the situation and context, and recorded other pertinent
observations, in a field notebook.
RESULTS
As indicated above, the prime concern of this part rested on
question 2 and on the data it would procure regarding active
information search; this is presented first. Findings from ques-
tions 1 and 3 on the explanations for the behaviors are presented
afterward, separately for scenarios A and B.
Active information search
With respect to its main aim, the investigation of active informa-
tion search, the questions about helping or not-sharing (A2 and
B2) were a failure. When asked what one needed to answer the tar-
get question, literally every participant simply repeated the target
question. When the ethnographer explained that they could ask
for any further information, nobody requested any. These ques-
tions seemed to be unintelligible or too abstract. Participants made
clear that they took it that the question itself sufficed to produce
an answer, and, if it did not, other questions could not help. To
ask in roundabout ways for further information so as to get to an
answer (like in a quiz game), which one could get directly, did not
make any sense to the participants.
Explanations for the behaviors
Talking about the scenarios gave some important insights, never-
theless; yet, they were different from what we expected.
(A) Helping scenario. The first question about the first scenario,
in which person X helps person Y (A1), was answered by eleven
people. One man was excluded from the analysis because he did
not address the question. Answers of the other 10 participants
can be grouped as follows (see Table 1; more than one answer
possible).
The most frequently given answer, that helping is based on
balanced reciprocity, was expected as it is a common feature of
sociality in PNG (cf. Tracer et al., 2014). Several respondents
located the reason for X’s behavior in the situation based on a more
generalized reciprocity in which intragroup exchange is organized
by an ethic of as-needed assistance. The spontaneous first answer
of three respondents, who assumed that Y had paid X to help him,
was less expected, but might be indicative of an increasing integra-
tion of the Wampar population into market economy. Only two
participants mentioned X’s disposition.
The question on what other Wampar may think about the
situation (A3) was answered by the same 10 participants. One
said he only knows what others think if he can talk to them.
Another respondent (a much criticized businessman who leases
Wampar land to non-Wampar migrants) inquired whether the
question referred to what people think about his own business5.
5The ethnographer had the strong impression that this man gave all answers in a way
which should correct his negative image and the anticipated critique of his manners,
which circulated among Wampar.




In numbers In %
Balanced reciprocity
Y helped X in the past or is expected
to help X in the future
5
Y provided food for X 1
X wants to marry Y’s daughter 1
Subtotal 7 36.8
Generalized reciprocity
X is feeling sorry 3
Y is alone 1
Y is weak and tired 1
Subtotal 5 26.3
Market exchange
Y gave money to X 3
Subtotal 3 15.8
Dispositions of X
X has special skills/knowledge 1
It is X’s manner [pasin] to help 1
Subtotal 2 10.5
General evaluation
This is good or good behavior [pasin] 4
Subtotal 4 21.1
Total 19 100.0
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Five assumed that others would answer as they had and merely
repeated what they had said – with only little variation, or with
additional reasons for their response. Five respondents said that
there are many different social behaviors and mindsets. Three
of this latter group emphasized ongoing social transformations,
largely caused by the introduction of a money-based economy;
they complained that today only money counts and that people
become more egoistic and lazy, and/or they only focused on their
own nuclear family referring to the conflict between communal
and individual values (Barker, 2007, pp. 9ff.).
(B) Deception scenario. Questions on this scenario were
answered by 10 participants (see Table 2 for an overview; more
than one answer possible).
The reactions of participants to the first question (B1) were
split like in the helping scenario: eight respondents located the
reason for the behavior in the disposition of person X. One par-
ticipant mentioned the transformative power of money as a cause
of deception as it changes the way people think and their social
behaviors. The answers of other participants, who stated what X
is doing, can be interpreted in a similar direction. They empha-
sized the circumstances and his desire, which explains his behavior,
rather than characterizing him as a person. This resonates with
everyday experience during fieldwork: when somebody took food,
Table 2 | Explanations for social interaction: deception.
Response categories (with concrete
responses)
Frequency
In numbers In %
Balanced reciprocity
Y deceived X in the past 1
Subtotal 1 4.8
Action of X (attributed to circumstances)
Money has changed the way people
think
1
X is lying (for a specific reason) 2
X needs the money for realizing a plan 4
Subtotal 7 33.3
Dispositions of X
X is selfish/greedy 5
X is lying (as a habit) 1
X is lazy / does not like to talk 2
Subtotal 8 38.1
General evaluation
This is bad or bad behavior [pasin] 4
Subtotal 4 19.0
Other





tools or other things from somebody else, the ethnographer was
often astonished that people got very angry about what happened,
yet did not blame the person or accuse him or her of possessing
negative character traits. For example, a young man once stole
cooked food that an older woman had put aside to be eaten in
the evening. This is thought of as extremely bad, disrespectful
behavior, and the woman’s family got very angry. But, even when
they found out who it was, the incident was explained in terms of
circumstances (he had been drinking, and become hungry) rather
than by character deficits in the young man. Mostly, deception,
stealing, and violent behavior were quickly forgotten and had few
consequences for the evaluation of the person in the future. One
respondent even blamed Y because he should find out himself
about the money and not rely on X giving it to him.
The question on how fellow Wampar would reply (B3) was
answered by 10 participants. Those who did answer the question
in the intended way were split: three replied that other Wampar
would give the same answer and four replied that they would
evaluate the situation in different ways. A woman made very clear
(like some participants after the first scenario), that “lifestyle” has
changed; she said: “Everybody follows his wife only and does not
share anymore (bihainim meri tasol, means looking after their own
family). Selfishness has become very common.”
DISCUSSION
In general, the findings from the first part of the study were infor-
mative with regard to the sociocultural dimension of the task (i.e.,
the attitudes and expectations involved or activated), but less so
in terms of information search: while we did obtain data on the
content of causal explanations, obtaining data on the processes
involved in causal reasoning was more difficult.
The causal explanations used in the helping scenario corre-
sponded partly with what we had anticipated, based on our
(anthropologically informed) picture of Wampar society and the
ongoing changes in their life-style (see Socio-Cultural Context).
Reciprocal relations are the links in the chains constituting the
fundamental relations of social networks. The principles of
balanced and generalized reciprocity are internalized early in life
and these thematize many types of action. Interestingly many
Wampar are very aware of the transformation of intentions and
motivations that has accompanied their increased integration
into market economy: nowadays some Wampar actively try to
avoid or curtail the reciprocal obligations that had been cen-
tral to their community6. Several participants emphasized the
transformative power of money, which encouraged people to
refuse help to others who could not pay, so that inequality also
becomes more pronounced. If people do not have any money
they must offer work or something else as ‘payment’ instead.
Some Wampar complained that mutual help in the context of
generalized reciprocity and community values has become rare
(cf. Barker, 2007, pp. 8–12).
In many answers, money is itself assigned a causal role in
social behaviors and their transformation. The desire for money
and things is here a causal force, which is less located in the
6This was especially a vital lesson to learn for shop owners in the villages who wanted
not to give all their goods away to kin, but be able to start a small bisnis.
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weakness of a person – following the notion of a ‘personality’
(Goldie, 2004) – but rather in outside powers and circumstances.
Behavior in the deception scenario was explained along these lines:
somebody with a plan to buy or do something, or a strong spe-
cific need for the money, is understandably motivated to deceive.
This resonates with comparative studies of American and Chinese
attributions of causes, which suggest differences between disposi-
tional and situationalist reasoning about social events (Morris and
Peng, 1994). It also evokes certain observations reported by Tracer
et al. (2014, p. 191) of the ultimatum and the third-party punish-
ment games as played by Au speakers in PNG: “Several player 2 s
expressed concern for the plight of player 1: ‘It’s all right, maybe
he really needs it and has some work he has to do with it,’ one said,
and yet another asserted, ‘It’s not good, it’s not a good split, but I
don’t care, he probably has a reason.”’
The change of social relations and the attendant diversifica-
tion of values was another topic repeatedly raised by participants.
Therefore making claims about social behaviors and the reasons
behind them among “the Wampar” has become even more dif-
ficult than it might have been in former times. Reflection by
many Wampar on specific changes of values and behavior facil-
itates discussions about shared (and non-shared) desires, beliefs
and reasons for social interactions. Our scenarios and the related
questions were starting points for discussion, although more
detailed and committed discussions happened in informal sit-
uations and in small groups of people who know each other
well.
Although it is clear when people’s exclamations express their
own moral attitude with a very general evaluative response, Em
gutfela (pasin)! (“This is good [behavior/manners]!”), central val-
ues might or might not be attributed by participants as a cause
for behaviors. This lack of clarity is exemplified in the sponta-
neous answers to the question “Why does X help/deceive Y?” In
the helping scenario, for example, these responses were often not
directly connected to causal reasoning, in the sense of “X does
it because it is good behavior.” In the deception scenario this is
particularly clear; participants often responded with a similarly
evaluative statement, “This is bad behavior,” without stating or
implying anything about the reasons for the behavior.
The dominant strand of research on causal cognition is basi-
cally concerned with the processes of perception, learning, and
reasoning about abstract causal relations (Michotte, 1963; Ben-
der and Beller, 2011; Waldmann and Hagmayer, 2013). In social
contexts, attributing causal involvement in an event is often inter-
twined with a moral dimension (Samland and Waldmann, 2014)
and with the ascription of responsibility for that event (e.g., Hei-
der, 1958; Shaver, 1985; Hewstone, 1989; Weiner, 1995). These
concerns appear to be reflected in the explanations of the Wampar
participants for the behavior of person X, some of which we ten-
tatively categorized as ‘dispositional’ (i.e., all those that refer to
the manner or personality of X in Tables 1 and 2), while other
explanations we categorized as referring to circumstances that trig-
gered them. Even less clear is the categorization of those cases that
reflect balanced reciprocity: these explanations seem to presup-
pose both a situation of on-going exchange and a willingness of
X to respond to this strongly normative relationship, as the joint
causes of his current behavior. More importantly, however, the
explanations seem to reflect a concern with the still important
relational dependencies among the protagonists. Please also note
that dispositional explanations are much more frequently given to
account for negative behavior (deception) than positive behavior
(helping).
Investigating the extent to which relational dependencies are
shaped by information on social categories such as kinship was
one prime goal of this task. In particular, we had assumed that par-
ticipants would be interested in collecting information that they
considered relevant for an account of the event, thereby reveal-
ing salient categories. However, to accurately evaluate a person,
relation, or situation by systematically collecting information was
not an aim of any of the participants – at least not in the way we
expected. Rather they used examples from their own social envi-
ronment to make sense of the scenario (cf. Stenning, 2012). Three
participants were clearly motivated in their answers by their own
personal situation and/or relation to the ethnographer. The active
information search task was therefore not successful in reveal-
ing the exploratory processes that people use. It also raised the
question of whether people are as interested as we assumed to
uncover causes behind behavior in order to evaluate it. Are rea-
sons or causes for behavior really necessary to understand, evaluate
and respond to others with whom they are in relations? If people
do not assume that somebody has a constant personality consti-
tuted by lasting characteristics, which have to be uncovered to
anticipate future actions, the motivation to explain causal connec-
tions between personal attributes and behaviors might be lower.
To explain behavior by circumstances opens up a wide spectrum
of possibilities which participants did not discuss for fictive sce-
narios but connected to the specificities of well-known social
situations.
PART 2: SCENARIO EVOKING EVALUATIVE RESPONSES
The main goal of Part 2 was (a) to investigate further what
defines and maintains relationships between people, especially kin
(e.g., emotional closeness, physical substances, commensality, or
sharing of food, growing up together, teaching and socialization,
or procreation), and (b) to scrutinize what Wampar saw as causes
of emotions and subsequent actions relevant to moral evaluations
such as punishment. In order to evoke such evaluative responses,
we crafted two fictive scenarios, one involving incest and one pat-
ricide, which are likely to be areas of strong moral feelings and
evaluations. In the course of this study, however, it became clear
that the (intense) discussion on the first scenario would take too
much time to follow this up with a second round. This section is
therefore confined to the incest scenario.
METHODS
The same participants were interviewed as in the first study, except
for the schoolboy and a man of 35 years, with whom the interview
was interrupted (thus rendering a total of n = 10 participants; age
M = 40.5 years, range: 18–73).
Material
The task focused on one target scenario revolving around incest
prohibition in several versions with changing types of kin, each
followed (ideally) by a set of 10 questions. The basic scenario
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described a situation in which close relatives of opposite sex feel
attracted, have intercourse and have a child together. The first
version featured a mother and her son:
“A young man was stolen as a baby and taken to a distant town, where a
family adopted him. He grew up as a son of the family. He never learned
anything about the family into which he had been born. One day, when
he was grown up, he came to his birth village. Here, he happened to
meet his still young mother, who was a widow. The two fell in love,
she got pregnant and they had a child. People found out that they were
related. There were many heated discussions about what had happened
and everybody started talking about it. What do you think people said?”
The second version exchanged sister for mother and was not
read out in its entirety, but was just repeated with the main infor-
mation staying the same.7 The narratives were followed by a series
of questions that can be clustered into three groups:
(I) Moral evaluations and their sharedness
(1) What do you think the people of the village are saying?
(And what might his/her relatives think/say?)
(2) How do the man and his mother [sister] respond when
they are confronted with what other people say?
(3) How would you say the man and the woman feel about
what happened?
(4) Is the son [mother/brother/sister, respectively] a good or
bad person? Are they equally so? If so why?
(II) Essentialist notions of persons and their relations
(5) The story states that they did not know they were related;
do you believe that? Would it be possible to recognize
relatives you have never met before? Would they have
intuitively felt that they are related?
(6) Do you think it is possible that the young man became
more similar to his adoptive family than to the one into
which he was born?
(7) What characteristics do you expect the baby to have?
(III) Practical consequences of moral evaluations
(8) Do you think the baby should be adopted by somebody
who lives a long way from the village?
(9) Will this child become a bad/good or unsuccess-
ful/successful man as an adult? Why?
(10) Do you think the young man should stay in the village or
leave?
In each section, participants sometimes gave no answer or
answered earlier questions, when confronted with a new question
and vice versa; this is discussed below.
Procedure and design
It was planned to read all scenarios (and variations of them) in the
same order to each participant, each followed by the same series
of questions. It turned out, however, that only the first version
of the (first) scenario could be read in its original version. A sec-
ond reading with variations (i.e., with different kin relationships
between the partners) or about a new topic (i.e., the originally
planned second scenario) would have been too long and boring for
the participants. For example, participants grew impatient when
7A variation of the scenario with a father marrying his daughter, which we had
planned as well, was abandoned because it would have been even closer to a real
incest case, which people referred to frequently.
asked to listen to the same initial sentences again as the ethnogra-
pher tried to test the variations in kin relations. Accordingly, she
changed the procedure for the second round and only asked infor-
mally how the participant would react if the protagonists were
related differently.
The first scenario was read to all participants, and the first
question was always the same for all participants. The follow-
ing questions had to be modified, simplified, and adjusted to
the conversation for reasons discussed below. However, the gist
of the questions remained the same; they were only less differ-
entiated and repetitive. For example, it did not make sense to
differentiate between the general gossip and what close relatives
said, so that the second part of the first question was left out.
Sometimes participants thought either the interviewer did not
listen attentively enough or did not understand their answer if
she asked “the same” – in fact slightly modified – question again,
which irritated and annoyed some participants and made them
impatient.
RESULTS
Participants’ responses are presented in the same order of the three
groups.
Evaluations and their sharedness for the mother/son-version
The first question (Qu.1, see Table 3) what other people would
say about the events described in the scenario was answered by
four participants immediately by affirming that there would be
Table 3 | Responses on moral evaluations and their sharedness
(cluster I).
Response categories (with concrete
responses)
Frequency
In numbers In %
(Qu.1) Moral evaluation attributed to the people of the village
Assessment as bad behavior 14 56.0
Concern with practical implications 4 16.0
People’s opinions will be diverse, some
indifferent
3 12.0
It doesn’t matter anymore 2 8.0
Focus on positive aspects 2 8.0
Total 25 100.0
(Qu.3) Feelings attributed to the couple
They were ashamed/felt bad 9 69.2
They will stay together 3 23.1
They did not worry 1 7.7
Total 13 100.0
(Qu.4) Participants’ own evaluation
Positive (because they did not know) 4 50.0
Negative 3 37.5
It doesn’t matter anymore 1 12.5
Total 8 100.0
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a lot of gossip but without being precise about the content. Four
emphasized that other Wampar would get angry because it is
his real mother, two participants blamed the woman (or said
other Wampar would blame her), that she should have found
out more about the man before having sexual relations with
him. While these types of responses mainly expressed a nega-
tive evaluation, four were concerned with practical implications
instead; three of these assumed people would say the couple
should marry, one they should separate although a separation
would raise the question of who looks after the woman and her
child8. A woman described different opinions, including indiffer-
ence about social behavior of others, which she blamed on social
change and the loss of the values associated with generalized reci-
procity. The answers show that attitudes are diverse and changing
among Wampar: participants consider a wide range of conditions
for the described behaviors and are reflexive about the diversity
of possible moral evaluations. Because the narrative provoked
immediate evaluative responses many seemed to find it difficult
to change perspective to report what they thought others would
have said.
One example shows that the interpretation of answers needs to
be understood in terms of the particulars of the everyday life. A
woman first said that everybody in the village would get angry, and
then exclaimed: “It must be LOVE! They should marry.” She used
the English word ‘love,’ unlike any other participant. She answered
the second question (what the couple thinks about the gossip),
and added,“They won’t worry about gossip and won’t follow what
other people say.” When asked about her own evaluation of their
behavior, she replied: “They are happy because they do not lis-
ten what others say. He must have come back to the village with
lots of money.” Her statements painted an unusual picture of an
intense love story. It turned out that she interpreted our scenario
in terms of her favorite Nigerian (“Nollywood”) soap opera True
Love.
The question how the couple felt about what other peo-
ple said (Qu.3) was answered (except in the above described
case) by most participants consistently: that they felt ashamed,
“bad” or “sorry.” With respect to their own evaluation (Qu.4),
participants were split (three replied that mother and son are
bad people, because what they did was wrong; four said that
they are good people, they did not know, what they were
doing).
Essentialist notions of persons and their relations for the
mother/son-version
We also wanted to probe how participants conceptualize the relat-
edness between mother and child and asked if the two could have
known that they were related (Qu.5, see Table 4). Four partici-
pants answered with a clear “no.” Two replied that being kin was
the cause of their attraction (meaning they noticed something),
but that mother and son confused affinity between kin and sex-
ual attraction. Two respondents explained that the mother should
have felt it because of her love for the child.
8Many unmarried Wampar women have illegitimate children; they usually live with
their parents or a sibling, some have an independent household. That means her
needs and the needs of the children (food, school fees) have to be fulfilled by the kin
group.
Table 4 | Responses on essentialist notions of persons and their
relations (cluster II).
Response categories (with concrete responses) Frequency
in numbers
(Qu.5) Possibility to know relatedness
Yes 4
No 4
Don’t know/cannot know 1
Total 9
(Qu.6) Similarity with foster family?
Yes (even if only behaviorally) 3
Not sure/no answer to the question 7
Total 10
(Qu.7) Characteristics of the baby
He will be good 6
He will be bad 1
Depends on the strength of parents’ belief 1
Don’t know/cannot know 2
Total 10
To find out how belonging creates similarity or difference, and
changes the quality of relations, we asked if the boy might have
become like his foster family (Qu.6). Two respondents answered
“yes”but did not clarify in which ways, one said his kastom (culture,
tradition), pasin (behavior, manners) and relations have become
the same as his foster family’s but that he still looks different from
them.
The next question focused on the child of the incestuous rela-
tionship and what characteristics it might have (Qu.7). Answers to
this question showed the highest agreement between participants9.
Most said that it will be a “good child,” but qualified their response
in different ways. Only one answered that because of the blood –
according to kastom – the child would be “bad.”
Practical consequences of moral evaluations for the
mother/son-version
In respect to how the baby should grow up (Qu.8, see Table 5)
opinions diverged. Seven of the participants said it should stay
with the parents or the mother, while three thought it would be
better to send it away, at least until it became an adult. On the
other hand, only one of the participants thought the couple should
remain together (Q.10).
9This might be due to a specific case which the question led many participants to
assume was the ethnographer’s real interest. That actual case might also explain
why people reacted less shocked by the narrative on incest than we assumed they
would be. During the interviews, it emerged that a Wampar widower married to a
woman of another ethnic group just had a fourth child with her, and that, in fact, the
woman was his daughter. This widely believed rumor also influenced responses to
questions about the offspring of such incestuous relations. Some participants said
that “Bubu-Dadi” (= Grandfather Daddy) and his daughter had produced healthy
children, which they thought of as a proof that incestuous relations per se cause no
health problems. Generally speaking, participants were easily drawn to volunteer
views on the causes and consequences of the case.
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Table 5 | Responses on practical consequences of moral evaluations
(cluster III).
Response categories (with concrete responses) Frequency
in numbers
(Qu.8) Where should the child live?
With the parents 5
With the mother 2
Should be adopted/move away 3
Total 10
(Qu.10) What should the couple do?
Move away to the town where he grew up 3
Separate 3
Follow their own feelings 1
Stay together in the village 1
It doesn’t matter anymore 1
Total 9
The variation featuring a brother and his sister as inces-
tuous partners (X2) provoked interesting responses, with an
increased number of participants ready to emphasize their relat-
edness by blood. Two participants rated the case as bad as
that in the first story, while three said it is much worse than
incest between mother and son. All five reasoned that the love
between mother and child is stronger in the mother/son-version
and that their blood is, in the case of real siblings (opposed
to cousins or parents and their children), even more similar or
identical.
DISCUSSION
Moral evaluations, their sharedness and practical consequences
The general evaluation of the events described in the scenario
(assessed with the first cluster of questions) was unanimously neg-
ative. With regard to the involved persons, however, the moral
evaluations diverged. Half blamed the couple (some more specif-
ically the woman), while the other half said that the couple was
not responsible because they did not know the truth. Notably,
many participants shifted focus from why this happened to prac-
tical solutions for the outcome, and some refused to make any
attributions whatsoever. In terms of attribution theory, the first
two types of responses reflect distinct tendencies: one the ten-
dency to personally blame the actors involved, and the other the
tendency to consider mitigating circumstances such as lack of
knowledge.
The third type of responses appears to be linked to a widely
reported disavowal of interest in reasons and responsibility for
action in the societies of the Pacific and other parts of the world
(for an overview, see Träuble et al., 2013). In addition, an ‘opacity
of mind’ has been described specifically for parts of Melanesia (see
Rumsey and Robbins, 2008 and the papers therein), that combines
(or substitutes) the disinterest with a reluctance to attribute mental
states and motives to others, based not (only) on disinterest, but
on respect for others’ privacy and autonomy, or on fears how
knowledge is used (for a discussion of the literature, see Laidlaw,
2013, pp. 158–159).
This raises an important question: are reasons and causes for
behavior really necessary to plotting the personal and political con-
sequences of those behaviors? Most of the participants took a very
pragmatic line of arguing in that they seemed to be not very inter-
ested in the question why something happened (the attraction, the
reasons for the confusion etc.), but more interested in and wor-
ried about the outcomes. How should the community deal with
deviant behavior? And how should relatives handle the results and
outcomes? The focus on questions like these has led to the charac-
terization of Melanesians as ‘pragmatic’ (cf. Barker, 2007), but this
pragmatism does not need to displace considerations of morality.
One has to understand the socio-cultural context of pragmatism,
as Read (1955) described in one of the first studies of morality in
PNG, specifying that their pragmatism is given shape in specific
cultural conceptions of the person and thus may vary according
to the relationship in play (Barker, 2007, p. 6).
As in Part 1, the results of Part 2 indicate changes in the moral-
ity of kinship among the Wampar, but they also underline the
difficulty of controlling the social setting well-enough to inves-
tigate cognitive responses formally (reproducibly) and effectively.
Most respondents were influenced strongly by known cases in their
social world. In addition to the case of “Bubu-Dadi” and his off-
spring, other instances of controversial marriages (for instance,
between classificatory siblings10) influenced people’s evaluations;
such cases also led participants to abandon rumination upon fic-
tional moral questions in favor of discussion of actual people and
their behavior.
Essentialist notions of persons and their relations
The question of kin relations was answered in many different
ways. Wampar ideas about the transmission of physical, men-
tal, and moral qualities from parents to children are vague. Many
still explain that blood determines children’s affiliation to the lin-
eage and clan of their father (as one participant in our sample
explicitly did). However, most of them add that many exceptions
exist and that nobody is really sure how corporeal inheritance
works. Some ideas may still be based on Wampar conception the-
ories that Fischer (1975, p. 128) described for the 1960s: the man
gives (erem) his wife the child and she carries (epeng) it. The
relationship between father and child is hence more important for
descent than that between mother and child. The child receives
his or her own blood (wi) only from the father, but an emo-
tional and bodily bond (the child is formed in the uterus) between
mother and child – developed through the uterus (wawang) dur-
ing pregnancy – is also thought of as important. This theory is
used in pragmatic ways, with little regard for coherence of doc-
trine, particularly when it comes to interpreting the belonging
of children of interethnic marriages (Beer, 2006; Bacalzo, 2012).
10A 2009 investigation into preferred marriage partners revealed cases of relation-
ships that were seen as incestuous according to Wampar norms. In recent discussions
about good and bad marriages, and relations between siblings and cousins, the dif-
ferentiation between cross and parallel cousins has become less important in norms
and practices. As kin-term usage tends to move away from Wampar norms to Tok
Pisin or English, it seems that certain differentiae (cross-sex/same-sex relative) have
become less salient.
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In the answers to our questions on the nature of social bonds,
Wampar were less essentialist than we had assumed and more prag-
matic or situationalist (“they did not know, so let them be happy
together”). The bonds between social/biological mother and child
were emphasized in many answers to our questions about where it
should grow up, or about the influence of foster parents, and some
explained that the attraction between mother and son emerged
because mother love and sexual attraction had been confused.
Most participants reasoned that an incestuous relationship
between siblings would be much worse than one between mother
and son who, on Wampar views, do not share blood even though
the relationship remains forbidden, because she has carried and
given birth to him. Some tendencies in the evaluations of behav-
ior and reasoning processes behind it are worth mentioning.
Aspects of family values and gender relations have been articu-
lated in several statements: if one of the partners is to be blamed,
it is the woman and not her son. She should have inquired
about his background before beginning a relationship, and it
was assumed that she would be more likely to feel that this is
her child, because of a special bond between mother and child.
This also resonates with pragmatic problems Wampar empha-
sized: who would look after her and the child? And how are the
child and his parents placed in the kinship system? The degree
of sharedness of evaluations of relations and sociality among
Wampar is another important aspect. Even from a small num-
ber of interviews the dimensions of sociocultural change and its
consequences have become obvious in the diversity of answers
from participants and their reflections on this period of social
transformation. Wampar seem to support Barker’s (2007, p. 12)
generalization: “Coastal areas that have had the earliest expo-
sure to colonial rule and are most deeply integrated into national
and international networks tend to be more tolerant of moral
ambiguity.”
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
It is widely agreed that, ideally, adequate psychological/cognitive
testing requires cross-cultural research (Bender et al., 2010; Hen-
rich et al., 2010; Medin et al., 2010; Beller et al., 2012). The
need to combine the controlled experiments commonly used in
psychology and the interpretive ethnographic research central
to anthropology has also been underlined (Beller et al., 2012).
Yet doing so is not easy, especially in the absence of details
concerning the practical problems, theoretical traps, and mis-
understandings that can emerge in cross-cultural settings. Here,
we address problems arising from such cross-disciplinary, ethno-
graphic work, some of which are similar to those experienced in
economic experimental games such as the ultimatum, dictator, or
third-party-punishing game (Tracer et al., 2014).
The local conditions to test our planned study on social-
ity and causality among the Wampar were ideal. The village
people are used to having ethnographers who stay for long peri-
ods, and ask many different kinds of questions. For instance,
the ethnographer had conducted some cognitive tasks on smells
during earlier fieldwork (Beer, 2014), which people found enter-
taining. Many Wampar enjoy doing specific tasks with some
interesting material such as samples of smells, colors, or pictures
and stories. Some even seem to favor them compared to more
general interviews. So, the motivation was good, trust no issue,
and nobody approached by the ethnographer refused to answer
questions. And still, several different kinds of problems arose.
For the subsequent discussion, we tentatively sorted them into
three clusters: issues with the practicability of task design and
execution, issues with data interpretation, and issues revolving
around validity.
PRACTICABILITY: INDEPENDENCE OF DATA, APPEAL OF TASKS, AND
HANDLING OF TASK VERSIONS
It was difficult to get Wampar to sit down and talk alone; fur-
thermore, after a few individuals had completed the tasks, it was
equally difficulty to find people who had not yet discussed the
scenarios extensively with other members of the community. The
whole point of routine interaction within the settlement – includ-
ing with an anthropologist – is for many Wampar precisely the
enjoyment of togetherness and casual conversation. Eventually, in
the cases documented above, it was possible to create a situation
in which only one person was present (at least for some time), lis-
tened to the scenarios and answered the questions, although this
in itself is already a deviation from naturalistic situations. In sev-
eral cases children listened or people joined for some time and left
again. In case of the questions about the child of an incestuous
relationship in Part 2, the laughter of others induced questions
and made the interviewer aware of the real case of “Bubu-Dadi.”
Here, the reactions of others – which should usually be excluded
in experiments – were advantageous because they made clear that
many participants had this case in mind when answering the ques-
tions. To prevent participants from sharing information and their
interpretations after the tasks was impossible: the main value of
learning something others have not is exactly in talking about it
and sharing the knowledge. So it is likely that some interpretations
and ideas about why the ethnographer was interested in helping,
deception, and incest would have circulated already and influenced
later answers participants gave.
One option for dealing with this problem might be to consider
collective sessions as a richer source of relevant discussions and
results (and one that might generate more interest and commit-
ment to begin with). However, while this might be a better strategy
for grasping local understandings in the pilot phase, it would exac-
erbate difficulties in data analysis and interpretation within and
between cultures were it used for the main study. Given the com-
paratively small population size, such collective sessions would
severely affect sample size – even more so when different versions
of the same story had to be discussed with different people or
groups of people (between-subjects).
For cognitive psychologists in lab settings, employing tasks like
the one used here presents almost no practical issues, even if it
takes considerably longer than an hour. When working with the
Wampar, however, it became clear that participants could not, or
did not want to, concentrate for longer than maximal 30 min.
This was particularly obvious in Part 2, where respondents began
to confuse persons in the scenario about incest (e.g., the child
stolen and taken to town with the child of the incestuous relation),
ceased to listen carefully, and even when they understood the ques-
tions, did they prefer to talk about different topics (such as the
actual case of “Bubu-Dadi,” other people they know or differences
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between living in town and the village). To be crystal-clear, this is
not attributed to the Wampars’ ability to concentrate on one task
or to stick to a single topic; rather, the observed difficulties must
be regarded as arising from the task and/or the way in which it was
presented.
This difficulty points toward the more general challenge of how
to design tasks in a manner that they appeal to and hold the atten-
tion of the people with whom we work. Finding a domain (such as
other people’s behavior) and scenarios (such as helping, deceiving,
or incest) that are of sufficient interest is a step in this direction,
but – as the difficulties faced in our study reveal – only a first step.
It may turn out that the abstract examples, and perhaps the set of
questions used to structure conversation, did not scaffold the kind
of engagement we hoped it would. As ethnographic knowledge is
not sufficient, in and of itself, to predict which aspects of a task
would be appealing to people, pretesting remains essential – and
that implies pretesting in every single cultural context in which the
study is to be conducted.
Related to the problem of task duration is the problem of
similarities across task variants, especially when, as in the ver-
sions of our scenarios, they were planned simply to substitute
one pair of kin with another, or aimed at being more or less
explicit with some aspects. Participants clearly lost interest in
listening to the “same” story several times. They became impa-
tient and the use of otherwise entertaining stories became a
chore. Especially reading the longer narratives twice turned out
to be too unnatural, and people preferred a situation in which
the ethnographer ‘read’ or even better ‘told’ them a story and
did not only ‘administer a test.’ The atmosphere for the discus-
sion about the series of questions was more relaxed and lively
after the narrative when it was read only once and further mod-
ifications (as exchanging the mother–son relationship against
brother–sister) were explained informally. Bolyanatz (2014, p. 283)
describes similar experiences for economic games used in other
parts of PNG. This makes controlling specific variables quite
difficult, especially when the obvious solution to this problem,
namely a between-subject design, is not feasible due to population
size.
INTERPRETATION: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN QUESTIONS, ANSWERS,
AND INTERPRETATIONS
More fundamental than the practical problems are concerns with
the understanding of the situation and the way the answers match
the questions. Attempts to figure out what the researcher has
in mind is generally an issue, and perhaps even more so with
psychological experiments—where participants expect concealed
purposes—than in fieldwork situation once a relationship of trust
has been established. But the unfamiliar interaction still requires
reconstruction of a common ground for the conversation to be
sensible, and this may interfere with the intention of the task
(e.g., Stenning, 2012). This problem is amplified by possible differ-
ences in conversational conventions, rules of language pragmatics,
and/or habits of perspective-taking.
An example that looks simple, prima facie, but turns out to be
rather complicated, revolves around the pragmatics of responses.
For example, in the deception scenario some participants
exclaimed “Em i giaman,” or “Em man bilong giaman.” The first
could be translated “He lies,” while the second could suggest that
it is his habit to tell lies, or doing so is part of his character, on the
basis of the dictionary definition of giaman. However, in every-
day life, these sentences might be used interchangeably, and only
to impugn somebody’s reliability rather than their truthfulness;
they might also be used for the pleasure of exaggeration. Other
examples could be given.
Several of the answers contain formulations which are some-
times difficult to interpret, including, for example, the simple
utterance “I don’t/cannot know” (mi no klia, mi no save). It
is not always clear from the reply if the person wanted to say
that s/he cannot answer due to lack of information or compre-
hension, or that one cannot know in general, or that she/he
declines to judge the behavior of others, or has lost interest
in the question. Here, our Wampar data connects up with the
complex of issues discussed under the heading of opacity of oth-
ers’ minds and cross-cultural variability (Danziger and Rumsey,
2013 and references therein). This is generally the case in studies
of the attribution of motives and causal reasoning about social
interactions.
When we asked, for example, what other Wampar would answer
if asked the same question, the aim was to access participant’s
ideas about shared (and minority) views relevant to behavior. In
many cases participants answered, but did not switch perspec-
tive; instead they repeated their own opinions and expanded on
them. This was not always explicated in their answers, but an
impression created in the interviewer, thus highlighting how diffi-
cult it can be to assess whether participants actually try to change
perspective. When asked about gossip in the incest scenario, for
example, many participants continued to think and talk about
their own evaluations rather than giving opinions of fellow vil-
lagers. Inter-individual differences in the willingness or experience
in perspective-taking are an issue as well, especially in cases where
participants simply repeated the story (rather than explaining it),
shifted perspective from other’s assumed opinion to one’s own, or
assumed that the researcher’s fictive story actually was meant as
a placeholder for a real event. Participants often referred to their
own life-world and personal situation rather than to the scenarios
we presented. In a face-to-face community, the micro-politics of
relations can rarely be entirely set aside.
Some participants added ideas to the scenarios, which they
found important, but which made it difficult to compare them
to other answers. For example in the scenario on the incest taboo
they speculated on whether the boy earned a lot of money in town.
Cole and Scribner (1974), in their study of syllogistic reasoning
among non-literate Kpelle of rural Liberia, report that participants
were reluctant to stay within problem boundaries: they altered
the conditions of the problem to be solved or added personal
experiences in order to come to a conclusion. Laypeople in literate
societies are also reported to resort to such elaborations when
faced with intricate problems, as Henle (1962) reports of American
students working to evaluate the adequacy of various syllogistic
forms.
Cole and Scribner (1974, p. 166) suggest that these sorts
of difficulties have consequences that go beyond the possibility
of amelioration through modifications to the tasks presented to
participants:
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“We cannot draw conclusions about reasoning processes from the
answers people give to logic problems. We have first to ask: ‘What is
their understanding of the task? How do they encode the informa-
tion presented to them? What transformations does the information
undergo, and what factors control these?”’
To give one example from Part 2: when we asked for the
characteristics of the baby of the incestuous relationship we
aimed at ideas about causal relations between immoral behavior
and later events/outcomes. Some participants seemed to assume
that the ethnographer meant the specific children of “Bubu-
Dadi” (because the ethnographer is interested in interethnic
marriages and kin relations) and responded that the child would
be okay, meaning mainly “healthy.” Others assumed the ques-
tion referred to general Christian values, perhaps triggered by the
helping/deception scenarios which address topics also discussed
at church meetings; according to this frame of interpretation the
child is a gift of God, which makes it per se “good,” or its charac-
teristics depend on the strength of the belief of the parents11. One
informant referred in his answer explicitly to kastom (tradition,
culture) saying the child would be bad. Two other participants
responded that they could not and did not know, a definite enough
statement, but one that left it unclear whether they thought that
the information necessary was omitted from the narrative, or
that information about how the moral development of a child
will proceed is in principle unobtainable. With a greater num-
ber of participants we would face even more of these different
interpretive frameworks for interpreting their responses.
This highlights the well-known problem of inter-individual
differences, due to the personal histories and/or personalities
of participants. These are particulars and this issue raises ques-
tions about the relationship between psychological universals and
particular cultural contexts.
VALIDITY: THE “HOME-FIELD DISADVANTAGE” AND SCAFFOLDING
Cross-cultural research, even when anthropologically informed, is
an intricate enterprise. In a challenging paper, Medin et al. (2010)
discuss issues that contribute to what they label the “home-field
disadvantage.” This handicap arises whenever one cultural group
(typically the researcher’s own group) is unreflectively taken as the
starting point for comparison, and may be manifested as: (1) a
tendency to leave one of the cultural groups unmarked, as if it
were the standard from which the others differ; (2) a tendency
to consider other cultural groups as more homogeneous than the
one taken as starting point, and definitely as more homogeneous
than they actually are; and (3) an excessive trust in the equiva-
lence of tasks across cultures – both in terms of how these tasks
would be understood and responded to by different groups, and
in terms of what the obtained data would be able to reveal. If
one takes, for instance, a standard psychological task on causal
reasoning as the phenomenon of interest, the problem with apply-
ing this for cross-cultural research is that this task will have been
specifically tailored to bring about a particular effect in the cultural
context (typically a WEIRD context), for which it was developed.
11Even the German nationality of the ethnographer might have had an influence, as
the first Lutheran missionaries were German, and although the difference between
missionaries and anthropologists is known, there might still be social desirability
bias in this answer.
As a necessary consequence (reasons for which include, among
others, regression toward the mean), the same task is unlikely to
produce similar results in other cultural contexts (Medin et al.,
2010). The antidote recommended by Medin et al. (2010) is a con-
stant effort in marking the unmarked cultural group, collaborating
with the group(s) researched, conducting research on the terms of
the respective culture, and taking multiple perspectives.
With the approach taken for the current study, this was exactly
what was strived for. In order to investigate how people under-
stand and account for the behavior of others conditional upon
their relationships, the point of departure was not a specific,
well-established task from psychological research, but a set of
(ethnographically informed) considerations on what the group
under study may be willing to talk about. Yet difficulties remain.
The most obvious is to figure out how the task should be modified
in a way that the Wampar will enjoy, and that would facilitate the
type of responses that in turn will help us to answer the questions
we have. Some of the experiences reported herein suggest fruit-
ful directions (e.g., replacing individual interviews with collective
session, limiting the number of key questions and task versions,
finding ways that invite perspective-taking more strongly).
In this context, we wish to explicitly acknowledge a suggestion
made by one of our reviewers. As the reviewer stressed, we need
to find ways that allow the research to scaffold and enhance the
participants’ capacity to report on the processes that govern their
considerations. A significant contribution by the ethnographer is
thus to illuminate what the participants will be drawn to, what
materials are familiar yet multiply interpretable, and what specific
ways to representing social life are relevant to the queries at hand.
In other words, relationality, historicity, and contextuality need to
be accepted as fundamental to any human intention and action
(see also Medin et al., 2010; Bloch, 2012) and thus would have to
be made an invariable part of any testing milieu. However, as the
same conditions should be granted to each participant from every
cultural group included in the comparison, the most fundamental
challenge will be to create comparable conditions without holding
details of the tasks and of the testing context constant.
CONCLUSION
Laidlaw’s (2007) characterization of the relationship between the
anthropology of religion and cognitive science of religion is helpful
at this point to clarify some of the problems we have encoun-
tered in our study and can partly be transferred to the realm of
social interactions more generally. He takes issue with the assump-
tion that cognitive scientists could “explain religion” in terms of
basic cognitive processes while what they actually deal with is a
limited subset of the features of “religion.” Religions, Laidlaw
insists, includes far more complex phenomena grounded in the
historically located intentionality of human beings.
In our own study, we tried to investigate how Wampar peo-
ple draw inferences about social interactions. The prime goal of
our study was thus not to understand allegedly universal processes
in causal inferences about social interactions (helping, deceiving,
sexual relations) to be then able to explain causal cognition in gen-
eral, but to understand the cognitive processes underlying causal
inferences in their sociocultural contexts and embedded in social
relations. Our study reveals how difficult it can be to get at basic
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cognitive ‘mechanisms’ or ‘processes’ through fictive scenarios pre-
cisely because of the relationality, historicity, and contextuality of
people’s intentions and actions.
However, Laidlaw also stresses that – while basic (universal)
processes cannot explain complex behavior – their understanding
is still an important pre-condition for good general understand-
ings of behavior. In this line, we propose that it is indispensable
to try to solve the problems arising when different theoretical and
methodical traditions raise meaningful questions and attempt to
answer them (for a compelling discussion of both the complica-
tions and the inevitability of cross-disciplinary collaboration, see
also Bloch, 2012).
Cognitive science needs anthropology in order to substanti-
ate any claims for the universality of cognitive processes (e.g.,
Astuti and Bloch, 2012; Barrett et al., 2012). Cross-cultural com-
parisons and the adjustment of research strategies and methods to
the social and cultural environments of non-WEIRD populations
are essential to achieve this goal. This paper exemplifies this with
the description of difficulties encountered in the process of making
a cross-cultural experiment relevant and reproducible in different
cultural contexts. From an anthropological perspective, long-term
fieldwork and naturalistic observation of behaviors with subse-
quent questioning still appears to be the best choice for getting
answers to questions about evaluations of and causal reasoning
about social interactions – although these procedures are not in
the strict sense of the term ‘reproducible.’ If in-depth knowledge
of relations and their history is crucial for understanding, psy-
chologists are well-advised to consider alternatives to the exclusive
reliance on quick experiments with a selective sample of people for
fast output. As Cole (1978, p. 629, 630) wrote “for the psychologist
this position poses the need to develop new techniques in order to
study everyday cognitive activities and their relation to the special
activities he designs. It also means the loss of certainty about his
most trusted tool, the experiment”. Members of the “Laboratory
of Comparative Human Cognition” took important steps in this
direction, especially Cole and his colleagues in the course of their
long collaborative research among the Kpelle.
While the necessities of long-term fieldwork, interdisciplinary
processes of developing a methodology and careful cross-cultural
testing of methods contradict the political economy of research
funding and the academic market, rising to this challenge is the
only promising way for real progress in this field.
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